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Abstract
Trust in the European Union is strongly related to trust in national political institutions
through extrapolation, i.e. cues from national politics. Most evidence for this mechanism,
however, is based on surveys using question blocks that present several institutions at
once in non-randomized order. We conducted six split-ballot survey experiments in five
European countries, asking about trust in national and European Union institutions (a)
separately or in the same question block and (b) in different question orders. Our findings
demonstrate survey context effects: asking about two institutions within the same ques-
tion block increases the correlation of reported levels of trust in these institutions.
Furthermore, our findings indicate that national primes decrease reported trust in the
European Union, providing novel micro-level evidence for extrapolation and cue-taking
from national politics in the formation of public opinion about the European Union.
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Introduction
Evaluations of the European Union (EU) and national political institutions are
intertwined – when citizens decide whether or not they trust the EU, this judge-
ment is rarely independent from national politics. For many citizens, the EU is a
relatively remote and complex political institution, about which they have little
knowledge and few readily accessible opinions (Clark, 2014). Consequently, when
asked about the EU, citizens often rely on their evaluations of national politics and
extrapolate their opinions about the EU from those national evaluations. This
extrapolation mechanism explains why trust in the EU correlates highly with
trust in national political institutions (Anderson, 1998; Harteveld et al., 2013;
Mu~noz et al., 2011), and why national political trust was identified as the strongest
attitudinal explanation of EU trust (Harteveld et al., 2013).
The majority of studies on the relationship between national and EU political
trust rely on surveys that include items on trust in several national and European
institutions within a single question block. Such surveys pose two major method-
ological problems for scholars with a substantive interest in either absolute levels
of trust or correlations between trusts in different institutions. First, including
different institutions as part of the same list of items with identical response
scales encourages response consistency and thus artificially increases the correla-
tion between the items. Second, within-block question order is usually not ran-
domized; items on national institutions precede EU institutions in most surveys.
Therefore, priming effects may also skew widely used measures for EU trust. This
raises the question to what extent existing findings of extrapolation reflect real-
world mechanisms, or are – to a certain degree – an artefact of the survey context.
We study the effects of survey context on the occurrence of extrapolation and
reported levels of EU trust, using an experimental set-up, which allows us to make
both methodological and theoretical contributions. First, we assess the extent and
nature of the effects of commonly used question blocks on the measurement of
institutional trust and the consequences for studies comparing national and EU
political trust. Second, and more fundamentally, the experimental set-up enables
us to put the extrapolation mechanism to a more rigorous test. Previous research
has mostly relied on correlations between measures of trust in EU institutions and
national political institutions. We use variations in survey context to analyze the
effect of cues from national politics on trust in the EU. The results contribute to
our knowledge of the cognitive processes underlying the formation of political
trust towards different levels of governance.
We distinguish two mechanisms that could produce survey context effects. First,
question order can enhance extrapolation: preceding questions about national
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political institutions could lead respondents to base their EU trust on similar
considerations. Second, general consistency effects can occur as responses to ques-
tions in the same block are assimilated, for instance due to satisficing response
behavior.
To disentangle these mechanisms, we employ a split-ballot survey experiment.
The experiment uses a 2 2 factorial design, varying both the question order and
whether the items are part of the same or different item blocks. We replicated our
experiment at different time points and in five different European countries. Our
findings show strong evidence of consistency effects: displaying trust items in a
single question block significantly increases the correlation between these items.
Furthermore, we find that question order matters: putting questions about nation-
al institutions first generally leads to lower EU trust, particularly among citizens
who are dissatisfied with their own government. Priming on national institutions
thus leads to an activation of national considerations when subsequently evaluat-
ing the EU, which lends support to the extrapolation hypothesis.
These findings have both methodological and theoretical implications.
Methodologically, our study shows that the use of standard item blocks for mea-
suring trust in different institutions affects the levels of measured trust and inflates
inter-item correlations. This urges researchers to carefully decide how to measure
institutional trust – using randomized question order or separate question blocks –
depending on the research question. We contribute to theories on the formation of
political trust in multi-level governance by demonstrating the impact of a ‘national
prime’ on subsequently expressed trust in the EU and provide novel micro-level
evidence for the existence of an extrapolation mechanism, i.e. citizens relying on
cues from national politics when expressing their trust in the EU.
Theory
National heuristics and EU trust
Political trust can be conceptualized as an evaluation of political institutions
(Kasperson et al., 1992; van der Meer and Dekker, 2011; Mishler and Rose,
2001). Such evaluations need to be based on some form of information about
the evaluated object. In the EU context, this is often information about economic
performance and identity-based considerations (Harteveld et al., 2013; Hooghe
and Marks, 2005). Specifically, the European debt crisis led to a considerable
decline in support for and trust in the EU (Gomez, 2015), but also in national
governments (Foster and Frieden, 2017). Similarly, the migration crisis negatively
changed public opinion about the EU (Harteveld et al., 2018). In addition, when
citizens have sufficient knowledge about both the EU and national institutions,
they may also use national politics as a ‘benchmark’ to judge the EU based on an
informed comparison (De Vries, 2018; Mu~noz et al., 2011; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000).
However, generally speaking, citizens often lack specific knowledge about the
performance and functioning of the EU, especially when compared to their more
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readily available knowledge about national political institutions (Clark, 2014;
Hobolt, 2007). When individuals lack the political knowledge to inform their
voting decisions or support for institutions, they are more likely to use heuristics
and cues as a basis for evaluations instead (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). In the case
of the EU, this means that trust in national political institutions ‘spills over’ or is
extrapolated to trust in the EU. Indeed, citizens who trust their own government
more are also more likely to trust the EU (Anderson, 1998). A similarly high
correlation has been found for satisfaction with democracy at the two levels
(Hobolt, 2012; Rohrschneider, 2002). Harteveld et al. (2013) identified extrapola-
tion as the most important predictor of trust in the EU, surpassing utilitarian and
identity-based EU evaluations (see also Armingeon and Ceka, 2014; Mu~noz,
2017). In line with this reasoning, the extrapolation mechanism is weaker for
more knowledgeable citizens (Armingeon and Ceka, 2014; Karp et al., 2003;
Mu~noz, 2017). The existing evidence is mostly based on correlational data, but
generally concludes that there is a causal direction: Citizens use cues from national
politics to form their trust in the EU and not vice versa. Armingeon and Ceka
(2014) support this assumption with analyses showing that (a) domestic political
events which lower governmental trust also lower EU trust and that (b) govern-
mental trust predicts EU trust, even when this relationship is controlled for EU
performance evaluations. In sum, existing evidence based on correlational data
supports the assumption of an extrapolation mechanism, but we lack causal evi-
dence of the impact of cue-taking on reported trust in the EU.
Survey context effects
An important limitation of studies comparing and correlating political trust on the
national and EU level is that most of them rely on data from the Eurobarometer
(Anderson, 1998; Armingeon and Ceka, 2014; Harteveld et al., 2013; Mu~noz, 2017;
Rohrschneider, 2002; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000); others have used the European
Social Survey (ESS) (Mu~noz et al., 2011). These two survey datasets share impor-
tant characteristics that may influence the measurement of institutional trust. Both
surveys follow the common practice of presenting the respondents with a block of
items measuring trust in several institutions. In both cases, data are collected
through face-to-face interviews, in which the interviewer asks how much or wheth-
er the respondent trusts a number of institutions. All institutions are named within
the same block and in a fixed order, with trust in the EU following trust in national
institutions. Interestingly, a study using questions from separate blocks by
McLaren (2007) concludes that national institutional trust is less important for
EU support than suggested by previous studies.
Survey research has demonstrated that an identical question can produce dif-
ferent response patterns depending on the preceding questions in the survey
(Schuman and Presser, 1996). Question context exerts this influence through
what is essentially a priming mechanism by altering the availability and salience
of the considerations that are used to answer the survey question at hand
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(Tourangeau et al., 2000: 198). In addition, similarly phrased questions can induce
a general need for consistency in respondents. These context effects can have two
kinds of consequences for the response pattern: directional and correlational con-
text effects (Tourangeau et al., 2000). Directional effects occur when the question
order leads to a change in the level of the variable of interest; this is generally the
case when the relationship between the target question and context question is
unconditional, i.e. when the context item has the same impact on all respondents
irrespective of their position on the context item. Correlational effects occur if
context effects alter the relation between the target and context questions; these
take the form of conditional effects, where the score on the context item determines
the score on the target question.
Hypotheses
Combining the literature on national heuristics and trust in the EU with existing
knowledge of survey context effects, we develop a set of hypotheses about survey
context effects on EU trust, and more specifically, what happens when national
political trust is probed before trust in EU institutions in a survey. According to
the extrapolation logic, EU evaluations are largely based on considerations about
national politics; someone who trusts national institutions is more likely to also
trust more removed institutions, whereas someone who does not trust national
institutions is less likely to trust the EU. Question order could make considerations
about national political institutions more salient. Asking about the national gov-
ernment before the EU could thus influence average reported levels of trust in the
EU, aligning the levels of trust in the two institutions and thereby making gov-
ernment evaluations a more important predictor for EU evaluations. Specifically,
asking about a less trusted national institution first would decrease subsequently
reported trust in the EU, in comparison to when the EU is asked about before the
national institution. Conversely, asking about a more trusted national institution
first would increase reported trust in the EU.
H1: Reported trust in the EU is higher when preceded by questions about a trusted
national institution, whereas it is lower when preceded by a non-trusted national
political institution (extrapolation hypothesis).
Most European countries, including the ones that we study, have rather low aver-
age levels of political trust (see e.g. Figure 2). Even in countries in which trust in
the national government is comparatively high, such as the Netherlands, Denmark,
or Germany, the average scores for trust do not exceed the mid-point of the scale.
Therefore, when prompted to think of their lower trust in the national government,
the average citizens would report lower trust in the EU due to extrapolation.
Consequently, the average level of trust in the EU would be lower when questions
about the EU are preceded by questions about the national government. Even
though levels of trust in the national government tend to be low in all countries
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we study, there are still considerable differences. We expect that the effect would be
strongest in the countries with the lowest levels of governmental trust.
Evidently, even in low-trust countries, national political trust varies consider-
ably at the individual level. As an additional test of our hypotheses, we analyze this
effect in more detail by considering citizens’ individual government satisfaction.
We expect that citizens with lower government satisfaction extrapolate and also
report lower trust in the EU when asked about the government first, whereas those
with high government satisfaction, in contrast, should report higher trust in the
EU when asked about the government first. In order to test this assumption, we
conduct an additional analysis for groups of citizens with high, medium and low
government satisfaction. We rely on government satisfaction for this test because
this variable is measured independently from the experimental manipulation.
The priming effect of displaying a national political institution before an EU
institution posited in hypothesis 1 will likely wear off over the course of a survey.
We expect that the extrapolation effect is stronger when items about EU trust and
trust in national institutions are part of one block, in comparison to when they
appear in two separate blocks. When the question about national politics directly
precedes the one about the EU within the same block, the immediate memory of it
should increase the effect, whereas the effect should be weaker when other ques-
tions are asked in between the two measures of trust.
H2: Extrapolation effects (H1) are stronger when EU and national political trust
items are part of the same question block (proximity hypothesis).
Context effects can also occur simply because placing questions closely together
creates a general need for consistency. ‘The juxtaposition of the questions high-
lights their logical relationship and increases the consistency of the answers [. . .]’,
yet such effects can even occur ‘when the relationship is not strictly logical but only
topical’ (Tourangeau et al., 2000: 213–214). This has been called the ‘near means
related’ heuristic (Tourangeau, 2004): if items stand closely together, respondents
can infer that they are related. Respondents can even ‘use the proximity of the
items as a cue to their meaning, perhaps at the expense of reading them carefully’
(Tourangeau, 2004: 390).
H3: The correlation between reported EU and national political trust is higher when
both are part of the same question block (consistency hypothesis).
Methods
The experiment was carried out in the context of a larger panel survey focused on
EU public opinion (Goldberg et al., 2019). The data were collected in the form of
computer-assisted web interviewing. Study 1, in January 2018, included 2648
Dutch respondents; Study 2, in December 2018, included 1942 Dutch respondents;
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Study 3, in December 2018, included 2678 Danish respondents, 2895 German
respondents, 2746 Hungarian respondents and 2867 Spanish respondents. Levels
of trust in both national and European institutions differ considerably across these
countries (see e.g. Special Eurobarometer 461, 2017). Quotas on age, gender, edu-
cation and region were enforced to ensure a representative sample of the respective
populations.
In order to measure our main variables of interest, we asked respondents how
much they agree with the following statements on a seven-point scale ranging from
‘not at all’ (1) to ‘completely’ (7): ‘I trust the European Union’, ‘I trust the national
government’, and ‘I trust the national parliament’ (see the Online appendix for
question wording). The order of these questions was randomized in four experi-
mental conditions. In addition, we asked respondents how satisfied they were with
the performance of their respective national governments on a scale ranging from 1
(‘very unsatisfied’) to 7 (‘very satisfied’).
In Study 1, Conditions A and B include the two questions on trust in national
political institutions and in the EU at the start of a larger block of questions about
institutional trust. In Condition A (N¼ 617), respondents are asked about their
trust in the two national institutions first (the parliament always following the
government), as it is usually done in surveys, whereas in Condition B (N¼ 687),
trust in the EU comes first. In Condition C and D, the trust questions are asked in
two blocks, which are separated by an eight-question block on political participa-
tion. In Condition C (N¼ 656), national trust precedes EU trust. This order is
reversed in Condition D (N¼ 688). In total, N¼ 2648 respondents participated in
the experiment.
In Study 2 and Study 3, we simplified the design and excluded the national
parliament, leaving only questions about trust in the national government and
the EU. Before making this decision, we analyzed an independent panel wave
dataset in the Netherlands (N¼ 2236), collected in June 2018, in which the ques-
tion order of all trust items was randomized. This analysis showed that the
correlations between trust in the EU are almost identical for both trust in the
national parliament (r¼ 0.766) and trust in the national government (r¼ 0.765).
Thus, the results are not likely to be affected by the choice of institution. Besides
this simplification, the design of Study 1 was fully replicated in Study 2. The
experimental conditions are visualized in Figure 1. It is noteworthy that the
Dutch samples in Study 1 and Study 2 are drawn from the same panel. Thus,
all Dutch respondents in Study 2 (N¼ 1942; NA ¼ 472, NB ¼ 497, NC ¼ 484, ND
¼ 489) also participated in Study 1, which further enhances comparability. Study
3 was an exact replication of Study 2 with respondents from Denmark (N¼ 2678;
NA ¼ 660, NB ¼ 655, NC ¼ 669, ND ¼ 694), Germany (N¼ 2895; NA ¼ 674, NB
¼ 752, NC ¼ 720, ND ¼ 749), Hungary (N¼ 2746; NA¼ 701, NB ¼ 704, NC ¼
681, ND ¼ 660) and Spain (N¼ 2867; NA¼ 686, NB¼ 721, NC ¼ 765, ND ¼ 695).
The results are visualized using the package ggplot2 (Wickham, 2016) in R (R
Core Team, 2016).
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Results
Figure 2 shows descriptive statistics for trust in the government, parliament, and
the EU for all five countries in the three studies. First, it is important to note that
trust in the government tends to be low in all countries, never exceeding the
mid-point (4) of the scale (ranging from 1 to 7). This confirms our assumption
that asking about the government first would function as a negative cue in these
countries. While there are no considerable differences between trust in the govern-
ment and trust in the EU in Denmark and Germany, trust in the EU is consider-
ably higher than trust in the government in Hungary and Spain. In the
Netherlands, the difference changes between waves: while trust in the EU is
Figure 2. Average trust in the EU, government, and parliament.
Note: Scale ranges from 1 to 7.
Figure 1. Experimental conditions.
*Note: The national parliament was only included in Study 1.
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somewhat lower than trust in the government (and parliament) in the first wave,
this difference becomes marginal in the second survey wave. While these results are
somewhat different than the results from the Eurobarometer (where trust is mea-
sured as a binary variable), they show the same general patterns – national insti-
tutions are more trusted in the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany than in Spain
and Hungary.
Study 1 – the Netherlands
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows that trust in the EU is highest in
Condition B, in which trust in the EU precedes national institutions in the same
block. A Bonferroni post-hoc test shows that EU trust in Condition A, in which
national trust precedes EU trust, is significantly lower (p< 0.01) than in Condition
B, C or D (see Figure 3). This evidence supports the extrapolation hypothesis:
when the EU is contrasted with national political institutions, trust in the EU is
lower. However, it also seems that this effect only occurs when the two trust
questions are displayed in the same block, as there is no significant difference
between Conditions C and D based on question order. This confirms our expect-
ations for H2. In other words, for extrapolation to occur, it is necessary that the
benchmark is recent and hence salient, according to the results of Study 1.
In a second step, we test H1 for groups of citizens with low satisfaction with the
national government (answering 1 to 3 on a scale from 1 to 7), medium satisfaction
(4), or high satisfaction (5 to 7). However, as visualized in Figure 4, there are no
clear-cut differences in the effects of the experimental conditions between the three
groups for Study 1.
Figure 3. Mean score on trust in the EU per condition for Study 1 and Study 2 in the
Netherlands.
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H3 stated that the correlation between trust in national institutions and trust in
the EU – the basis for the extrapolation hypothesis – would be lower when the two
items are not displayed within the same question block. We test this hypothesis for
the two national political institutions, government and parliament, separately,
using Pearson’s correlation coefficient and Fisher’s r-to-z transformation. The cor-
relation between trust in the government and trust in the EU is r¼ 0.71 in
Condition A, r¼ 0.69 in Condition B, r¼ 0.63 in Condition C and r¼ 0.63 in
Condition D. We combined Conditions A and B into a one-block condition
with 1304 respondents in which the correlation between trust in the government
and trust in the EU is r¼ 0.699, and Conditions C and D into a separate-blocks
condition with 1344 respondents, in which the correlation is r¼ 0.631. These two
correlations are significantly different from each other (z¼ 3.14, p< 0.01). This
shows that the correlation between trust in the government and trust in the EU
is somewhat higher when the two are asked within the same block, which is typ-
ically the case in existing surveys. The correlation between trust in the national
parliament and trust in the EU is r¼ 0.64 in Condition A, r¼ 0.72 in Condition B,
r¼ 0.64 in Condition C and r¼ 0.61 in Condition D. These results are not identical
to the correlation between EU trust and government trust. However, the lower
correlation between trust in the parliament and trust in the EU could be caused by
the item order. In Condition A, national institutions precede the EU, but the
specific question order is parliament – government – EU. Therefore, it is plausible
to assume that consistency effects are stronger between the government and the
EU question than between the parliament and the EU question in this condition.
In Condition B, where the order is EU – parliament – government, the correlation
is the strongest for the EU and the parliament, i.e. the two institutions that follow
Figure 4. Mean score on trust in the EU per condition for Study 1 and Study 2 in the
Netherlands for citizens with low, medium and high government satisfaction.
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each other directly. This finding further supports our hypothesis that consistent
response patterns increase when survey items about trust directly follow each other
and emphasizes the fine-grained nature of these effects.
Study 2 – the Netherlands
The replication of our study in the Netherlands, shows a similar, but not identical,
pattern of results. In this replication, trust in the EU is highest in Condition D, and
almost as high in Condition B; the difference between the two is not significant
(p¼ 1.00). Trust in the EU in Condition A is significantly lower than in Condition
D (p¼ .03). The other differences are not statistically significant. However, the
pattern of results is similar: trust in the EU is higher when it is not preceded by
a question on trust in the national government, which lends some further support
toH1. The analysis for the separate groups of government satisfaction displayed in
Figure 4, however, provides only mixed support for H1. Respondents with high
government satisfaction have the highest EU trust in Condition B (in which the
EU precedes the national government within the same block), which does not
support extrapolation. On the other hand, respondents with lower government
satisfaction have the highest trust in the EU in Condition D (where the EU pre-
cedes the national government with a buffer question block between the two),
which supports the idea of extrapolation (H1), but not H2 on question proximity
effects.
The correlation between trust in the government and trust in the EU is r ¼ 0.81
in Condition A, r¼ 0.78 in Condition B, r¼ 0.78 in Condition C and r¼ 0.73 in
Condition D. In Conditions A and B combined (N¼ 969), the correlation is
r¼ 0.784, whereas in Conditions C and D (N¼ 973), it is r¼ 0.755. This difference
is not significant (z¼ 1.57, p¼ 0.12), which means that the correlation between
trust in the government and in the EU does not depend on whether the two are
asked in the same or separate blocks. In contrast to Study 1, this does not confirm
hypothesis 3.
Study 3 – Denmark, Germany, Hungary and Spain
For all four countries, simple ANOVAs show significant group differences in the
levels of trust in the EU across the experimental groups. These differences are
visualized in Figure 5. The results from Denmark are highly similar to the findings
from Study 1 in the Netherlands; trust in the EU is significantly lower in Condition
A than in Condition B (p¼ 0.01), offering support for the extrapolation hypothesis
(H1). The results from Germany follow a similar pattern but are closer to the
results from Study 2 in the Netherlands: only the difference between Conditions
A and D is significant (p< 0.01), also supporting H1. The difference between
Conditions A and B goes in the same general direction but is not statistically
significant (p¼ 0.06).
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The results from Hungary and Spain, the two countries with the lowest levels
of government trust, are similar to the results from the Netherlands,
Denmark and Germany, but more pronounced. These results also support the
extrapolation hypothesis (H1): when the less trusted national institutions are
asked about first (Conditions A and C), trust in the EU decreases. In Spain, the
difference in trust in the EU is significant for Conditions A and B (p< 0.01), as well
as for C and D (p¼ 0.01). Furthermore, the differences between Conditions A and
C (p< 0.01), A and D (p< 0.01) and B and C (p< 0.01) are also significant. The
difference between Condition A and B is greater than between C and D,
which supports hypothesis 2. In Hungary, the difference in trust in the EU is
only significant in the separate-blocks condition: while Conditions A and B are
not significantly different (p¼ 0.37), Conditions C and D (p< 0.01), as well as A
Figure 5. Mean score on trust in the EU per condition for Study 3.
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and D (p< 0.01) are significantly different, which still offers support for H1, but
not H2.
When the analysis is split into three groups of citizens with low, medium and
high government satisfaction, the results become more clear-cut across all four
countries: while there are no considerable differences in EU trust between the
experimental groups for those who have high government satisfaction, the differ-
ences become more pronounced for those with medium satisfaction and are highest
for those with low government satisfaction (see Figure 6).
In other words, when the national government is made more salient through
question order, those with low government satisfaction react to this cue by report-
ing lower EU trust; for those with high government satisfaction, no effect of
national government cues is visible. Thus, all things considered, the results of
Figure 6. Mean score on trust in the EU per condition for Study 3 for citizens with low,
medium, and high government satisfaction.
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Study 3 lend strong support for the existence of an extrapolation mechanism in all
four countries, yet the impact of national cues seems to be limited to negative cues
(i.e. less trusted institutions).
Regarding hypothesis 3, the results consistently show that the correlation
between trust in the EU and trust in the national government is stronger (or in
the case of Hungary, the correlation is less negative) when the two questions were
asked in the same block, rather than separately. This supports hypothesis 3.
Table 1 shows the correlations in each experimental group and for Condition A
and B, as well as C and D combined. The z-score and corresponding p-value are
based on the correlations of the combined conditions.
Discussion
Our study investigates how cues from national politics can affect political trust in
the EU, using experimental evidence with multiple replications in different con-
texts. There are two main results. First, we find quite consistent evidence that the
correlation between one’s political trust in national institutions and the EU is
stronger if the two items are in the same block. Second, we find evidence for the
effect of question order on the occurrence of extrapolation processes in different
countries. Most results point to the extrapolation effect being increased when a
question about the EU is preceded by a question about the national government.
Our analyses also give insight into the underlying mechanism: particularly
respondents with low government satisfaction extrapolate from their governments
to the EU when the government is made more salient through question order. This
Table 1. Correlations between trust in the national government and trust in the EU in different
experimental conditions.
Condition
A B C D
Denmark r¼ 0.617 r¼ 0.555 r¼ 0.446 r¼ 0.360
Combined r50.586 (N¼ 1315) Combined r5 0.402 (N¼ 1363)
z¼ 6.34, p< 0.001
Germany r¼ 0.862 r¼ 0.864 r¼ 0.809 r¼ 0.754
Combined r50.864 (N¼ 1426) Combined r5 0.783 (N¼ 1469)
z¼ 6.87, p< 0.001
Hungary r¼0.128 r¼0.218 r¼0.275 r¼0.291
Combined r520.173 (N¼ 1405) Combined r520.285 (N¼ 1341)
z¼ 3.10, p¼ 0.001
Spain r¼ 0.552 r¼ 0.485 r¼ 0.447 r¼ 0.405
Combined r50.526 (N¼ 1407) Combined r5 0.427 (N¼ 1460)
z¼ 3.43, p< 0.001
Note: To compare correlation coefficients, we use Fisher’s r-to-z transformation and Pearson’s correlation
coefficient.
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indicates that the process of extrapolation might be mainly based on negative
primes, at least in the European context, where trust in the national government
is often low.
These findings have both methodological and substantive implications.
Methodologically, the results highlight the need to tailor questionnaire design to
the specific research question, whenever possible. Even though large-scale, cross-
national surveys like the Eurobarometer or the ESS offer unique, high-quality data
and their use is certainly justified, they measure political trust in a single block, in
which trust in the EU follows trust in national institutions. Researchers interested
in trust in multiple specific institutions, rather than overall institutional trust,
should consider randomizing the display order of institutions within a block.
For researchers with a particular interest in the levels of trust in the EU
(or other specific supra-national institutions), it may also be advisable to ask
about said institution first, thereby avoiding respondents extrapolating from
more familiar institutions, such as the national government. Researchers with a
particular interest in multi-level government could also consider separating evalu-
ations of institutions on different levels within a survey, especially when evaluating
the relative importance of cue-taking in comparison to other explanatory varia-
bles. This will likely prevent the inflation of correlations between trusts in different
institutions due to survey context effects. Overall, our findings stress the impor-
tance of accounting for potential effects of questionnaire design and adapting
questionnaires to the specific requirements of a certain research question. They
also tie in with previous criticism of survey context effects in, for instance, the
Eurobarometer (Haverland et al., 2015; H€opner and Jurczyk, 2015; Saris and
Kaase, 1997). At the same time, it is important to note that the effects of survey
context are limited and, in this particular case, do not drive findings on extrapo-
lation in the EU literature. Therefore, our results also show that data from the ESS
and Eurobarometer are nevertheless suited to give insights into such questions.
Substantively, our study contributes to understanding the processes through
which citizens develop their (dis)trust in the EU in an experimental setting. This
allows us to isolate the effect of national institutions as a prime, and directly test
whether this prime leads to extrapolation. Even though the evidence is not clear-
cut across all countries, the findings generally support the extrapolation hypothe-
sis. This implies that when forming their EU trust, citizens tend to use more readily
available information about familiar institutions. Mentioning the national govern-
ment before the EU decreases trust in the EU relatively consistently across con-
texts. It is noteworthy that our separate analysis for citizens with higher
government satisfaction does not show a reversed pattern of extrapolation in the
opposite direction, but rather just fewer effects. This could indicate that a positive
cue from national politics is not as effective at eliciting an extrapolation response
as a negative cue, which would be in line with a general negativity bias.
However, this finding could also point to alternative explanations, for example
that the national government functions as a negative prime regardless of its per-
ceived or objective quality. Possibly, the government prime makes respondents
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think more about certain policy areas that are dominated by national politics, such
as social welfare issues, rather than EU politics. It could also shift respondents’
focus to incumbent politicians and parties on the national level, which could go
hand in hand with a greater focus on the role that these specific actors simulta-
neously play in EU politics in the subsequent questions. However, these explan-
ations remain speculative and still speak to the idea of a heuristic-based
extrapolation mechanism. Future research could use specific control variables or
diversify the type of experimental cues to further test the nature of the extrapola-
tion hypothesis. It would also be interesting to replicate this experiment in other,
non-European, multi-level government contexts, especially in cases where the
lower-level government is more trusted.
Overall, the results further support theories of cue-taking in the formation of
public opinion about the EU. Given relatively low levels of political knowledge
about the EU, it is not surprising that citizens rely on alternative information, such
as cues from national politics, to base their evaluations on (see also Armingeon
and Ceka, 2014; Mu~noz, 2017). There are potentially greater implications for
democracy: Citizens who find themselves in multi-level government contexts
could generalize dissatisfaction with national politics to the supranational level
and lose political trust, which ultimately undermines the democratic legitimization
of elected officials and institutions.
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